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Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organizations  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
States, state agencies, multilateral agencies, and other non-market actors are relatively under-
studied in strategic management and organization science. While important contributions to the study of 
public actors have been made within the agency-theoretic and transaction-cost traditions, there is little 
research in political economy that builds on resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral 
approaches to the firm. Yet public organizations can be characterized as stocks of human and non-human 
resources, including routines and capabilities; they can possess excess capacity in these resources; and 
they may grow and diversify in predictable patterns according to behavioral and Penrosean logic. This 
paper shows how resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches to understanding 
public agencies and organizations shed light on their nature and governance.  
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1. Introduction 
That governments own and control valuable resources is so much a part of our daily discourse 
that we almost take it for granted. Analyses of taxation and government expenditures are as ubiquitous as 
taxation itself (Barzel, 1976; Kiesling, 1992; Samuelson, 1986). Typically, we think of governmental 
bodies controlling land, buildings, and budgets; yet  government agencies, as organizations, control many 
kinds of valuable resources: infrastructure such as highways (Small & Verhoef, 2007) and prisons (Hart, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), sensitive information about top-secret military activities (Vandenbroucke, 
1993), knowledge systems such as rules of law (Tamanaha, 2005), and organizational assets such as the 
cultures of bureaucracy at established agencies (Peters, 2001). As a result, the fields of regulatory 
economics, antitrust analysis, law & economics, political economy, and public administration all have 
their own specialized journals, societies, and academic programs.  
Demand for insight about the nature and effective governance of public resources has never been 
greater. In the wake of the financial crisis and economic downturn, public and quasi-public entities such 
as credit-ratings agencies, the Federal Reserve System, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have been thrust in 
the spotlight (Brunnermeier, 2009; Cecchetti, 2008; Demyanyk & Hemet, 2008). What were their roles in 
the housing bubble and bust (Coleman, LaCour-Little & Vandell, 2008)? Did they fail to discharge their 
responsibilities? A US legislative effort to subject the Federal Reserve System to greater Congressional 
scrutiny brings many of these issues to the fore. Should central banks be ―independent‖ -- mostly free 
from public and legislative oversight, constraint and sanction -- to exercise their functions adequately, or 
should they be subject to political or market discipline (Blei, 2009)?  
The September 11, 2001 attacks raised similar questions about the US domestic security 
apparatus (Wise, 2002). Oliver Williamson‘s 2009 Nobel Lecture noted that the creation of the US 
Department of Homeland Security by consolidating formerly free-standing defense and intelligence 
services into a large, diversified organization is analogous to the formation of private conglomerates and 
other well-known kinds of business restructuring, and yet there was little analysis of the efficiency 
implication of the consolidation, despite decades of research on diversification and other resource and 
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corporate consolidations.
1
 What are the consequences of integrating previously independent units with 
separate cultures, organizational forms, and mandates? How can the integration be optimized on both 
effectiveness in achieving goals and efficiency in achieving cost synergies? What kinds of innovation are 
enabled by the integration? What are the potential costs, including ―big government‖ per se and its widely 
discussed downsides (Bacon & Eltis, 1976; Feldstein, 1974; Wolf, 1993)? 
Research in public and private administration has long acknowledged the central importance of 
resources in defining and shaping goals in the public sector. Allison‘s (1971) account of the Cuban 
missile crisis showed how military objectives are shaped by available resources and how these resources 
affected options, each with costs and risks. Baum and McGahan (2010) submit that current US and UK 
action in Iraq has been shaped in part by the conceptualization of military goals enabled by the 
deployment of private and public resources in tandem. During the Vietnam War, resource dependency 
and the bureaucracy of administration that accumulated around particular resources, so constrained 
strategic options that the US persisted even in the face of conditions that, had they been evident at the 
outset, might have deterred military action (Sheehan 1998).
2
 
The current paper maintains that the field of organization science and strategic management can 
offer significant insights into the nature and effective and ineffective governance of public organizations. 
Public entities, like private firms, have been described using the language of entrepreneurship theory 
                                                          
1 Agarwal, Barney, Foss and Klein make the same point about the government-led merger of Chrysler and 
Fiat: ―The justifications for these actions are familiar to anyone who studies corporate strategy — the 
mythological search for synergy.‖ But ―[m]ost such corporate combinations — even those done voluntarily in 
non-crisis settings — fail to realize sought-for synergies‖ (2009: 474-475). 
 
2 Allison (1971) notes that examination of bureaucracy in the Carnegie tradition (Cyert & March, 1963; March 
& Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947; Simon et al. 1950) — from which the current paper draws — is a linear 
descendent of the classic study of bureaucracy by Weber (1947), which explored the advantages of 
bureaucracy as an ―ideal‖ type, emphasizing the rationalistic, impersonal, and specialized aspects of 
bureaucracy, as well as many of Weber‘s (1947) followers who presented the disadvantages of bureaucracy. 
Merton (1940) emphasized inefficiencies and dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic impersonality when it 
crossed into rigidity — a theme highlighted in political science by Lindblom (1977) and in management by 
Leonard-Barton (1992). Selznick (1948) observed large and decentralized bureaucracies, and emphasized the 
problem created by divergent sub-goal pursuits, a decidedly Carnegie theme. Gouldner (1954) placed in the 
foreground the possibility that revealing explicit rules internally may lead to minimally acceptable behavior 
and thus decreased efficiency.  
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(Klein, et al., 2010): governments, government agencies, social enterprises, charitable organizations, and 
other ―non-market‖ decision-makers are alert to opportunities for value creation and capture, exercise 
judgment over the deployment of resources under uncertainty, and introduce technological and organiza-
tional innovations. Yet a central facet of public organizations that has not been studied comprehensively 
is the creation, stewardship, dynamics, and allocation of public resources and capabilities.  
Important differences arise between public and private organizations relating to the definition and 
measurement of objectives, the ability to measure performance, and the role of governance. More 
generally, governments and government agencies transform resources into outputs and deploy the 
services of resources (Penrose, 1959) to achieve particular goals, which typically are not related to 
profitability, although they may be well expressed in terms of self-interested behavior. They play an 
important role in the allocation of resources. As such, one would expect organizational economics 
(Mahoney 2005) — including agency theory, transaction costs theory, property rights theory, the 
resource- based & dynamic capabilities, and the behavioral approaches — to shed considerable light on 
the activities and performance of non-market decision makers (Baron, 1999; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
The organizational economics and strategic management literatures on the firm have devoted 
relatively little attention to the existence, boundaries, internal organization, growth, and performance of 
non-market organizations (Hill, Keim & Schuler, 2004). Research in political science and public 
administration relies on terms such as ―resources‖ and ―transaction costs‖ and examines issues such as the 
growth of public agencies (Horn, 1995; Peters, 2005), but few studies in these fields build explicitly on 
concepts, theories, and models from organizational economics and firm strategy. In particular, while 
agency theory, and to a lesser extent transaction costs theory, have informed some research studies of 
public entities (Moe, 1993; North, 1990; Spiller & Tommasi, 2003), the resource-based and dynamic 
capabilities approaches have rarely been employed (McWilliams, Fleet & Cory, 2002; Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008). Surprisingly, the same holds for behavioral theories as inspired by the work of Simon 
(1947) and the Carnegie School.  
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At first glance, this relative neglect is surprising: public organizations can be characterized as 
stocks of human and non-human resources, including routines and capabilities; they can acquire and/or 
develop excess capacity in these resources; and they may grow and diversify in predictable patterns partly 
in accordance with Penrose‘s (1959) logic. Importantly, ideas developed by Cyert and March (1963) and 
Simon (1947) are arguably at least as relevant for public organizations, as they are for private ones. In this 
sense, resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches may provide additional insight on 
the nature, behavior, governance, and performance of public entities. 
The current paper provides a critical review, synthesis, and reevaluation of the extant research 
literature on public organizations as firms, emphasizing contributions from economic and organizational 
theories of the firm, particularly the resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and recent behavioral 
approaches. We begin with a treatment of ―public‖ resources, in the resource-based approach to the firm‘s 
sense of resources. What makes an opportunity, activity, or outcome ―public‖ or ―private‖? What is the 
nature of public resources as distinct from private resources? Obviously some resources used by public 
actors — labor, buildings, office equipment, and human capital — have private market values, such that 
use by public actors carries an opportunity cost; moreover, public entities must (usually) compete with 
private entities for the use of these resources. Other resources either cannot or are not used privately and 
have no market values in this sense. Objectives and constraints can differ greatly between market and 
non-market actors (Bonardi, Hillman & Keim, 2005; Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Hirschmann, 1982). 
The next section applies the distinction between public and private resources to public agencies as 
firms. We show that resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and modern behavioral approaches to the firm 
have richer implications for public policy than the perspectives of neoclassical economics, agency theory, 
and transaction costs theory. For example, we maintain that many state agencies have grown by a logic 
that is explicated in terms of a synthesis of behavioral and Penrosean ideas.  
The third and final major section suggests that applying current theory to public-sector challenges 
in resource development, capability-building, and the cultivation of knowledge and behaviors — noting 
the ways in which these resources may develop over time — could substantially improve the efficacy of 
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public administration. Recent developments in the organization and strategy fields regarding the 
identification of resource value open a window on issues of public importance, where organizational 
performance is intractably difficult to evaluate. We now know a great deal about how to identify and 
assess the value of private-sector resources, and by extending this insight to the public sector, we offer a 
perspective on how publicly owned resources are effectively managed. 
2. The resources and capabilities of public organizations  
 Critical to resource-based, capabilities, and behavioral approaches to organizations is the concept 
of resources. Public organizations such as government bodies, multilateral agencies (such as the United 
Nations and World Health Organization), and informal actors produce ―public‖ outputs — i.e., they do 
not buy and sell their products on the market, relying on financial measures of firm and business-unit-
level performance (Mises, 1944) — while using both public and private inputs. But what exactly are 
―public‖ resources? How do they differ from ―private‖ resources (e.g., can they be characterized in terms 
of uniqueness, inimitability, and divisibility)? What do these differences imply about how resources are 
acquired — i.e., are there strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986) for collectively owned, politically 
controlled resources — and how are they combined and re-combined (Maritan & Florence, 2008)? 
 Answers to these questions rest in part on a conceptualization of what constitutes the appropriate 
scale or unit of analysis for understanding public actors. Should the focus be on communities, village and 
city governments, states & provinces, national governments, or multinational authorities? We take on the 
challenge by first acknowledging the importance of interactions between governmental authorities at each 
level: just as scholars currently study small, large, and multinational firms and the interactions between 
them, so should we study public agencies with various spans of authority and interactions between them. 
Second, we define public agencies without having to refer to the ―public interest,‖ which we view as 
multi-faceted, frequently changing, and difficult if not impossible to define (Arrow, 1951). Third, we 
confine our attention to public agencies that ―own‖ and control resources either formally or informally. 
Many of the agencies that we examine have constitutional, legislative, or other formal authority to create 
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resources through the levying of taxes or the accrual of fees through some well-defined mechanism, 
although some do not. What distinguishes the agencies that we study is their stewardship over resources 
that are not under the exclusive control of any other private or public actor. In other words, to qualify as a 
subject of our study, an organization must be a collective of some kind and must possess decision rights 
over the governance of resources (Olson, 1965). We turn first to theory for greater clarity in definitions of 
public resources. We then explore the relationships between public resources and public organizations, 
and finally turn in this section to questions about how public resources are governed. 
2.1. The nature of public resources 
Consider the very idea of public resources. ―Public‖ in this context cannot mean simply 
―collectively owned,‖ as many, if not most, private resources are owned or controlled by groups (share-
holders, partners, family members). It also cannot refer to a resource‘s public-goods characteristics (non-
excludability and non-rivalry in use) because private organizations rely critically on resources that are at 
least partly public goods, such as knowledge, reputation, and goodwill. Hence a meaningful definition 
must distinguish between market and non-market ownership and control: private resources, in other 
words, are owned or controlled by identifiable individuals or groups operating in a voluntary, market 
setting, while public resources are owned by states that have the ability to use legally sanctioned coercion 
to acquire and deploy them.
3
 
How are public resources valued? Public organizations own or control private resources, which 
are acquired in factor markets and have market values (land, buildings, inventory, IT systems, lobbying 
skills, and reputation) (Austen-Smith, 1993; Besley & Coate, 2001; de Figueiredo & Kim, 2004). 
However, other resources owned or controlled by public organizations do not have private value, either 
because they have no private analogue or because they cannot be used privately (e.g., military resources 
and physical infrastructure that could not also be put to private use). Public entities may also own or 
                                                          
3 There are nuances, as private firms may obtain and use resources by state favor, and grant of privilege. Legal 
and political rules define and enforce the system of property rights, within which private ownership is 
exercised, so even ―private‖ resources may rely on ―public‖ elements for their existence and protection. 
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control resources that have supra-private value; in other words, the value of the resource would be 
misstated by its private analogue either because of commons problems or because the public nature of the 
resource cannot be valued privately. For these reasons, valuing public resources is difficult.  
 One approach under the resource-based view is to characterize resources as valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) (Barney, 1991). The VRIN criteria yield insight about the 
existence of sources of potential competitive advantage within firms, and are analogous in the public 
domain to the emergence, boundaries, and growth of assets within a public jurisdiction that must compete 
for decision rights with other agencies that may seek to control resources similarly. VRIN criteria are 
most relevant in explaining why a state might have emerged to start with — by means of protecting VRIN 
resources from being usurped by rival groups-states (North, 1990). Moreover, the control of property 
rights over VRIN resources by state functionaries will have important implications for transaction costs, 
taxes accruing to the principal, and intra-national competition to control them. In addition, the develop-
ment and leveraging of VRIN resources can be a potent source of competitive advantage for nations 
(Porter, 1990). 
  The sustainability of competitive advantage in the private sector has been associated with control 
over resources that are (a) difficult to transfer across organizations, often because of their intangibility 
(Itami & Roehl, 1986); (b) inimitability; (c) non-substitutability; and (d) durability, which distinguishes 
resources from activities (Porter, 1991). In the public sector, strategically important resources have the 
same character: They are durable assets, which are difficult to transfer between agencies, unique in some 
essential way and thus difficult to substitute in the achievement of the agency‘s mission. Sustainability 
criteria are particularly important to understanding the behavior of public agencies as bureaucracies that 
build a scaffolding of administrative structure on top of resources that may form the original basis of their 
charter. The effective deconstruction of the scaffolding requires careful examination of the underpinning 
resources so as not to dismantle valuable and important assets through the process. 
 Theories of appropriability in the private sector emphasize how strategically important resources 
yield competitive advantage for organizations. Mechanisms of appropriability fall into four categories:  
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(a) complementarity, (b) property rights, (c) governance, and (d) embeddedness. Complementarity arises 
when an organization possesses multiple assets that in combination enable the achievement of goals and 
is directly analogous in the public sector to resource combination. Property rights relate to the ability of a 
controlling organization to exclude others from profiting from the deployment of a strategically important 
resource. In the public sector, the proprietary benefits in fulfillment of mission achieved through property 
rights are generally observable. Governance theories relate to the organization‘s ability to deploy 
resources more effectively and efficiently than potential rivals, and extend into the public domain. 
Finally, embeddedness in the private context relates to the ways in which an organization can build a 
cluster of activities and complementary resources around the strategically important resource, and thereby 
appropriate returns from the resource by making its extraction difficult or even impossible. Public 
agencies may appropriate benefits from resources through exactly this process. 
 In the analysis of private-sector resources, insight is often obtained by examining the interplay 
between the existence, sustainability, and appropriability of competitive advantage obtained by an 
organization through its access to resources. For example, some organizations that have achieved and 
sustained competitive advantage historically may no longer appropriate the advantage because of hazards 
that have developed dynamically. Alternatively, a mature organization may appropriate advantages from 
resources and thus sacrifice their sustainability.  Examining public resources for their existence, sustain-
ability, and appropriability benefits requires a detailed understanding of their characteristics.  
2.2. Public resources and public organizations 
 While there is substantial scope for applying the resource-based approach to the public domain, 
we suggest that this approach can be usefully analyzed within the overall context of Penrose‘s (1959) 
resources approach, especially as it is linked to the behavioral view (Cyert & March, 1963). This 
theoretical linkage is useful because in Penrose (1959), firms are conceived as bundles of resources that 
provide services to serve a particular objective. This conceptualization applies directly to public 
organizations, which are also resource bundles — the main difference being the objective. Unlike the 
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private firm‘s focus on economic profits (or value capture), the objective of public organizations is meant 
to be the pursuit of the public interest (or value creation). This theoretical linkage has applications to the 
nature, growth, and boundaries of public organization, as well as the public–private nexus, both of which 
have been largely neglected in the research literature. 
 The current paper posits that all organizations and their constituent individuals aim to capture 
value from their actions, action potential, and value-creating advantages (Pitelis & Teece, 2010). In the 
case of private firms, success takes the form of profit (or value capture). However, in order to capture 
value a private organization must often create it in the first place (Penrose, 1959). Similarly, a public 
organization purportedly aims to create value for the wider public interest. However, at the level of the 
individual, the public agency, and/or the state as a whole, some part of the created value needs to be 
captured. Such value capture can take the form of the re-election of the politician, the survival and growth 
of the public agency, and the raising of revenues through taxes by the state. In this context, the aim of the 
private sector is to appropriate created value, while the aim of public organization is to create 
appropriable value. The two objectives are closely related, but there are important differences and 
implications for issues such as growth, boundaries, internal decision-making and functions, and 
differential advantages derived from dynamic capabilities. 
 Despite increased interest in ―hybrid‖ forms of organization, the treatment of intra-organizational 
decision-making is not in the foreground of transaction costs, resource-based, or dynamic capabilities 
approaches. They are, however, at the heart of the behavioral view (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958). Fundamental insights of the behavioral view relate to adaptive aspirations, adaptive 
expectations, attention, bounded rationality, information processing, inducement-contributions balancing 
of stakeholder interests, interdependence, organizational coalitions, organizational learning, resource 
allocations, routines, problemistic search (that is partly random, but not blind), slack-induced search, 
satisficing, sequential decision making, sub-goal pursuit, uncertainty avoidance, and the quasi-resolution 
of intra-firm conflict through the use of organizational slack (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 
1952, Thompson, 1967). In such an environment, human thinking is the most important resource, and 
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organizational decision makers must be mindful of the scarcity of attention. In operations management 
terms the bottleneck is the brain. Simon notes the strategic implication: ―An information-processing 
subsystem (a computer or new organization unit) will reduce the net demand on the rest of the 
organization‘s attention only if it absorbs more information previously received by others than it produces 
— that is, if it listens and thinks more than it speaks‖ (1982: 175).  
 Bounded rationality has several important consequences including (1) selective perception of 
information, (2) adaptive, sequential information processing, (3) mental effort that is reduced by heuristic 
procedures, and (4) a process of active reconstruction for memory (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1982). 
Systematic biases result with insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes, insensitivity to sample size, 
misconception of chance, failure to recognize regression to the mean, illusory correlation, insufficient 
adjustment and anchoring, and biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events 
(Kahnemann, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Given these biases, the behavioral approach considers the 
organization as an adaptive response to uncertainty and bounded rationality, and a vast (and more 
efficient) information processor than any given individual. Further, the main effect of the information and 
communications technology revolution has been to make capacity for attention rather than information 
the critical scarce resource in most organizational (and personal) decision making (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 
1982). Indeed, information is what consumes attention, frequently resulting in information overload.  
These ideas concerning organizational capabilities apply even more strongly to public 
organizations than to private firms. Capabilities are programmatic, typically have elements of tacit 
knowledge, and are largely embedded in organizational routines (March & Simon, 1958). These routines 
serve several important functions, including organizational memory as organizations remember by doing 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), and are facilitated by common language and coding (Arrow, 1974). Routines 
can also serve as a truce in inter-organizational conflict to maintain internal political stability, which 
enhance the efficacy of organizational slack (Cyert & March, 1963). 
 There are synergies between Penrose (1959) and Cyert & March‘s (1963) behavioral approach. In 
Penrose‘s (1959) theory of firm growth, slack is endogenous. It arises because specialization, learning by 
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doing, and intra-firm knowledge creation and innovation lead to an excess capacity of resources. Entre-
preneurial managers in pursuit of profit aim to leverage these resources for the purpose of value capture 
(profit). In this sense, innovation induces slack, which motivates further innovation (Pitelis, 2007). The 
absence of a direct profit motive in public organization breaks this positive loop since (emergent or 
intended) slack need not engender appropriable innovation. Instead, it is more likely to be used for the 
purposes of intra-organizational conflict alleviation (Cyert & March, 1963). The growth of public 
organization in this context serves uncertainty avoidance more than risk taking and value capture strategy. 
 The nearest analogue to the profit motive of public organization is the collection of taxes. Taxes 
can help satisfy all the multivariate objectives of state functionaries, be they re-election, private benefit, 
and quasi-conflict resolution. Considering that public organization per se is not meant to be a profit 
making entity, the question emerges as to how it can best create the conditions for the maximum possible 
revenue of the state (in the form of taxes) to be assembled.  
 The concepts of absorptive capacity and differential dynamic capabilities and advantages 
(Penrose, 1959; Cyert & March, 1963; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dosi et al., 2000, 2008; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) are important in this context, as are the concepts of market 
extension (Olson, 2000), market creation (Casson, 2005) and market co-creation (Pitelis & Teece, 2010). 
Olson (2000) employed the concept of market extension to explain how states can raise more revenues, 
not only by minimizing transaction costs and attenuating conflict, but also by creating value proactively. 
The emphasis on market extension-derived value creation extends North‘s (1990) work and suggests that 
public organizations can help extend existing markets through requisite actions. In the private entrepren-
eurship literature, Casson (2005) maintains that private entrepreneurs and firms can create markets. Pitelis 
and Teece (2010) go further in positing that market and value co-creation are important means through 
which entrepreneurs can achieve their value capture objectives. In this framework, (private) organization 
helps effect this co-creation, in tandem with customers, suppliers, competitors, and other stakeholders 
participating in this value creation process, including public organization and the state.  
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 The concept of market and value co-creation shows how public organizations and the state as a 
whole can help enhance overall value creation, which, indeed is the pool of prospective taxes. In this 
context, market and value co-creation can be seen as an important vehicle through which the state can 
achieve its complex objectives, all served by the raising of taxes. The concept of market and value co-
creation has affinity to, but also extends and operationalizes, Ostrom‘s (1990) focus on institutional and 
organizational complementarities. While laudable, and supported by evidence, Ostrom‘s (1990) view 
gives insufficient attention to issues of agency and differing objectives and conflicts. These issues are 
central to agency and behavioral approaches. Market and value co-creation can help satisfy mutual public 
and private objectives while simultaneously providing the slack for requisite innovation by the private 
(value creation) and conflict alleviation (distribution) by the public. 
 Market and value co-creation involves absorptive capacity, dynamic capabilities, and differential 
advantages, and requires the establishment of legal frameworks, as well as the allocation and re-allocation 
of property rights to help co-create markets that can capture as much appropriable value as possible. 
Markets with existing VRIN-type resources and/or with a promise to develop such resources could be a 
candidate. Their selection by the state requires knowledge, as well as appropriate organization and 
incentive structures that filter and frame decision making processes (Tsoukas, 2009). It requires that 
public agents and public entrepreneurs (Klein et al., 2010) aim to capture as much as possible out of value 
brought about through market and value co-creation. As private firms too aim to capture value 
engendered through market and value co-creation, this approach brings closer the aims of public and 
private actors. At the same time, it is based on the existence of different comparative advantages; the 
private sector in the setting-up of organizations (firms) that help co-create markets and value, the public 
sector in facilitating that process through the reduction of transaction costs, the extension of markets, and 
the co-creation of markets and value. Both public and private organization requires legitimization, intra-
firm conflict resolution, ideology, and leadership. They are, however, applied in different domains, intra-
firm and intra-society respectively. This difference in domain also points to the different and requisite 
(dynamic) capabilities of private entrepreneurs versus public entrepreneurs. 
 
 
14 
 Leveraging modern developments in organization and strategy can build upon and extend insights 
from economics, law, and political science by emphasizing the requisite capabilities of private and public 
entrepreneurs and highlighting the coordination and management of market and value co-creation. This 
market and value co-creation framework differs from extant views on the nature, growth, and boundaries 
of comparative economic organization. We maintain that market co-creation is an underpinning raison 
d’être of both private and public organization. It also helps explain the growth and evolution of private-
public interaction, which is becoming increasingly sophisticated in a knowledge-based, semi-globalized 
economy that requires resources, knowledge, and capabilities for market co-creation. The boundaries 
between public and private are predicated not only on dynamic transaction costs (Langlois, 1992), but 
also on differential (dynamic) capabilities in setting-up private organizations for the purpose of value 
capture through market and value co-creation (by private agents). Our approach also emphasizes the 
definition, protection, re-allocation, and distribution of property rights and the provision of institutional 
frameworks, mental models, and incentives that help co-create markets and appropriable value, a share of 
which is acquired (by public organizations) as taxes. Learning how to manage public and private market 
and value co-creation to mutual advantage, and creating incentive and organizational structures to do so, 
will partly determine the competitive advantage of nations. 
2.3. Governance of public resources 
Given that most publicly-owned resources are also partially owned privately, how should govern-
ance decisions be made? As public interests change how should public ownership of resources change? 
How should public agencies govern private resources that impinge on the public interest? How should 
resources that arise at multiple levels of government be coordinated? As noted above, public and private 
actors often compete in the same factor markets, even if public organizations do not sell their output in 
markets. Moreover, public officials, like corporate managers, do not own the resources they acquire and 
deploy but act as stewards on behalf of ultimate owners. As in the corporate governance literature, this 
relationship suggests potential agency problems such as the overuse or misuse of resources. While 
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strategy and organization scholars are familiar with control mechanisms used by shareholders to limit 
managerial discretion in corporations, the research literature on governance and control of states and state 
agencies is not generally taught in business schools or given a prominent place in management research. 
Klein et al. (2010) discuss some problems faced by non-market organizations in limiting 
discretionary behavior by state functionaries. Non-market decision makers operate in a more complex, 
and typically weaker, selection environment than private firms. Objectives are complex and ill-specified, 
performance targets are difficult to formulate, and feedback may be indirect. This ambiguity suggests the 
importance of administrative procedures to discourage rent-seeking. 
We suggest here that insights from organization theory and behavioral science provide significant 
insight into these governance issues. Organization theory, while significantly developed in the field of 
public organization, has not been applied as extensively to the administration of particular resources per 
se. Consider, for example, public resources such as those deployed in banking systems, military 
initiatives, large-scale humanitarian relief actions, and major infrastructure projects. Major resources may 
include, respectively, the public trust, authority to challenge a sovereign, an airport such as at Port-Au-
Prince in Haiti, and the international air traffic control communication system. The creation, preservation, 
deployment and enhancement of each of the resources may involve interaction between many public and 
private actors, each with overlapping but distinctive agendas. Examining the legitimacy, status, and 
agency of each type of organization in the governance of resources carries the promise of yielding 
important insights for understanding how resources are effectively and efficiently managed. 
Bounded rationality also affects the way organizations govern resources. Organizational defenses 
(Argyris, 1990) and groupthink (Janis, 1972) describe two dysfunctional governance processes that may 
emerge as public actors with access to strategically valuable resources seek to deploy them in situations of 
goal ambiguity and conflict. Allison‘s (1971) third interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis describes 
competing psychological profiles of critical decision makers as powerful determinants of their positions 
regarding resource allocation. Further research on governance under conditions of bounded rationality is 
needed to develop principles for evaluating administrative structures as stewards of critical resources.  
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3. Public organization as resource administration 
How can we move from the notion of public resources to a resource-based, capabilities, and 
behavioral approach to public organizations? By analogy, consider economic theories of the firm. 
Economists since Adam Smith (1776) have written about the effects of state action on business activity, 
but the application of economics and management theories to non-market organizations is a more recent 
phenomenon (e.g., Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Public choice 
economics and positive political theory model political actors with the same tools used by economists to 
model market actors: preferences, constraints, exchange, and equilibrium. The emerging field of ―non-
market strategy‖ (de Figueiredo, 2009; Shughart & Razzolini, 2003) treats campaign finance, lobbying, 
litigation, and other political and legal activity as integrated elements of firms‘ strategies for value 
creation and capture (Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002).  
3.1. Neoclassical and transaction costs perspectives 
Neoclassical economics tends to explain public organization in terms of market failure and with 
an eye to supporting the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics (Dasgupta, 1986). Early 
treatments focused on defense, the provision of justice, and public works, to justify the existence of the 
state (Mueller, 2003). The market failures approach has subsequently been developed to include 
―imperfect‖ market structures (such as monopoly) and other types of externalities. Coase‘s (1960) logic 
focused on the ―internalization of externalities,‖ explaining hierarchical organization, both private and 
public, as a response to market failure resulting from high transaction costs (Arrow, 1970; Coase, 1937, 
1960). Coase also points out that: ―we find a category ‗market failure‘ but no category ‗government 
failure.‘ Until we realize that we are choosing between social arrangements, which are all more or less 
failures, we are not likely to make much headway‖ (1964: 195). Williamson concurs, adding that 
―[hypothetical organizational] ideals are operationally irrelevant. Within the feasible subset, the relevant 
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test is whether (1) an alternative can be described that (2) can be implemented with (3) expected net 
gains. This is the remediableness criterion‖ (1996: 210).4 
Following similar logic, and building on Williamson (1975, 1996), this paper maintains that the 
public sector too is likely to be beset with bounded rationality, asset specificity, and opportunistic 
behaviors. This reasoning provides a transaction (organizational) costs explanation of ―government 
failure‖ that helps complement more conventional public choice approaches (Mueller, 2003; Wolf, 1979). 
Government failures can be at least partially explained by the myopia, rigidity, and conflicting policies of 
government agencies, and by political forces that allow interest groups to influence elected and unelected 
officials to initiate and perpetuate inefficient policies that enable these interest groups to accrue rents 
(Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990; Wintson, 2006). Williamson‘s (1975: 118–122) focus on the limits of vertical 
integration in the private sector concerning internal procurement (logrolling), internal expansion, and 
program persistence biases apply even more strongly in the government sector. Seen in this light, the 
transaction costs approach is useful in explicating markets, private and public failures, and therefore, 
institutional failures, which enables a comparative assessment of imperfect (market, hierarchy, and 
governmental) alternatives. Transaction costs theory also predicts the boundaries of market, firm, and 
public organization in terms of relative transaction (versus organizational) costs. In so doing it also 
explains endogenously why all production is not organized through a huge integrated private firm, or by 
the state (central planning). 
A few political scientists have incorporated transaction costs and concepts of bounded rationality, 
asset specificity, bilateral dependency, and the fundamental transformation (Williamson, 1985) into their 
analysis of political action and political institutions. Moe (1993), however, points out key differences 
between market and political organization that render the application of transaction costs theory to politics 
problematic. Moe‘s (1993) builds on the concepts of ―political uncertainty‖ and ―political compromise.‖ 
                                                          
4 Demsetz called the market-failures approach the nirvana fallacy: ―The view that now pervades much public 
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‗imperfect‘ 
institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in 
which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements‖ (1969: 1). 
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The concept of political uncertainty suggests that within the political framework the government succeeds 
in ―usurping the property rights of others‖ and therefore that economic choices by decision makers are 
different from those in the market. Under political uncertainty:  
[Decision makers] would be concerned with more than simply making efficient choices about the 
use and disposition of their property. They would also be concerned with taking action to 
protect their rights from usurpation — and with making current choices about their property 
that recognize and adjust for the possibility that other actors might seize their rights to the 
property in the future (Moe, 1993: 123). 
 
This reasoning does not simply imply a different setting in which transactions take place, but is more 
fundamental: it is ―uncertainty about the very basis of all transactions‖ (Moe, 1993: 124). This political 
uncertainty requires considerations of the specific costs of political transactions. 
Political compromise refers to the larger setting in which a transaction takes place. Any contract 
is the result of ―bargaining and haggling‖ under which process the actors make a number of compromises 
in order to reach a mutually satisfying solution. But in politics ―those who are able to exercise public 
authority can impose their preferred outcomes on everyone else‖ (Moe, 1993: 126), which means one 
party does not make compromises while the other is forced to make whatever compromises the party with 
authority requires. 
Williamson (1999), by contrast, maintains that government and private action should be regarded 
as alternative modes of governance — virtually everything done by government could, in principle, be 
done, or has historically been done, by private actors — and thus transaction costs theory can shed light 
on the efficient governance modes for various transactions. For instance, transactions in the public sphere 
include procurement transactions which are ―akin to those of make-or-buy‖ (Williamson, 1999: 319) and 
regulatory transactions that are ―often beset with asset specificity‖ (1999: 320), which implies that trans-
action-cost reasoning is useful. 
Williamson (1999) introduces a new key attribute in addition to asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency for public transactions: probity. Probity refers to the ―loyalty and rectitude with which certain 
public transactions are to be discharged‖ (Ruiter, 2005: 292). Due to government embodying the public‘s 
authority, sovereign transactions require probity. Specific configurations of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
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frequency, and probity determine the efficient choice of governance structure among market, private 
hierarchy or hybrid, and government (Williamson, 1999). 
3.2. Evolutionary and behavioral perspectives 
 The transaction costs framework in its early incarnations was comparatively static, and thus less 
applicable to the growth and evolution of institutions. Later developments by North (1981, 1990) adopted 
an historical, evolutionary perspective while incorporating the view that the driving force of economic 
change is a dominant group of ―principals,‖ which is more akin to behavioral views and is absent from the 
early transaction costs approaches. On the basis of such innovations, North (1990) explained the state in 
terms of the pursuit by principals of increased wealth (to tax) though increased efficiency and reduced 
transaction costs. North (1990) noted, however, that the pursuit of systemic transaction costs reductions 
may be hindered by the principals‘ need to tax the emerging wealth efficiently. This objective leads to 
induced favors (transfers of property rights) to organized groups (such as monopolies), which North 
(1990) maintained would more easily be taxed. Accordingly, the principals‘ interests may differ from the 
interests of the system as a whole. This conflict could produce systematic inefficiencies. Moreover, the 
actions of the principals are constrained by competition from within (other potential principals) and 
without (rival states).  
 North (1990) synthesized transaction costs, public choice, property rights, and agency-based 
views in a path-dependent, evolutionary context. However, North (1990) remained firmly within the 
confines of economics and did not consider resource-based (dynamic) capabilities and behavioral views, 
currently of much interest within organizational science and strategic management, views that the current 
paper submits can offer fundamental insights to the debate. 
 Behavioral economics has experienced a renaissance in recent years (Frantz, 2009), with many 
applications to finance, but fewer to management and organization. An emerging behavioral literature — 
sometimes termed ―libertarian paternalism‖ — seeks to apply behavioral insights to the design of public 
policies (Ariely, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; O‘Donaghue & Rabin, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 
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2008). This research literature suggests that private actors suffer from biases and cognitive limitations 
such as lack of willpower or self-control, status quo bias, optimism bias, and susceptibility to framing 
effects leading them to make decisions that are inconsistent with their own preferences. By making 
marginal changes to the options available to market participants (―nudges‖), the private benefits and costs 
of various actions, and the informational environment in which choices are made, market participants can 
be led to make ―better‖ choices without reliance on heavy-handed, top-down regulation.  
 As a few critics have pointed out, however, this research literature downplays the cognitive and 
behavioral limitations affecting policymakers. The most obvious is Hayek‘s (1945) ―knowledge problem‖ 
which limits the ability of government officials to design effective paternalistic policies (Rizzo & 
Whitman, 2009a). The well-known incentive problems under bureaucracy are relevant to paternalism as 
well (Glaeser, 2006). There is also what Rizzo and Whitman call the ―slippery-slope‖ problem: the 
vulnerability of these proposals ―to slippery slopes that can lead from modest paternalism to more 
extensive paternalism‖ (2009b: 667). This concern, in Penrose‘s (1959) terms, is with the growth and 
diversification of the paternalist policy-making apparatus. The idea of slippery slopes in policy design, 
fueled in particular by the cognitive and behavioral limits of the policymaking team, shares much with 
behavioral theories of firm growth. 
 More generally, behavioral considerations should be incorporated, along with informational and 
transaction cost problems, into comparative institutional analysis — not only the choice between markets, 
hierarchies, and hybrids (Williamson, 1996), but also the choice among public policies. On the one hand, 
the neoclassical welfare economics challenged by Coase (1960, 1964), Demsetz (1969), and the public-
choice approach did tend to present an unsophisticated view of state actors (e.g., portraying regulators as 
omniscient, benevolent social planners) (Backhouse & Medema, 2006).  On the other hand, the Chicago 
School approach while successfully challenging such an unsophisticated view, has received its own share 
of criticisms. For example, Eggertsson (1990) notes that Demsetz (1969) held an overly optimistic view 
that property rights would develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization became 
greater than the cost of internalization. Characteristic of this optimistic view, the formulation of decision 
 
 
21 
making with regard to property rights is solely in terms of private benefits and private costs.  This price 
theory approach, however, neither deals with the free-riding problems that plague group decision making 
nor attempts to model political processes.   
 In short, as applied to political action, neoclassical theories of the firm attempt to explain the 
―prices‖ and quantities of non-market transactions, agency-theoretic approaches focus on the incentives 
given to public bureaucrats, and transaction costs theory considers the make-or-buy decision and the 
efficient governance structures for various transactions. None of these approaches, however, addresses the 
political equivalent of sustained competitive advantage — why do some government bodies, bureaus, and 
agencies outperform others? Why do some survive, persist, expand, and diversify while others are 
absorbed by other agencies, dismantled, or radically restructured? Here we submit that resource-based, 
capabilities, and behavioral theories of the firm add significant insight. We elaborate on these 
implications in the next section. 
4. Implications and discussion  
How does an understanding of public entities help us design, position, and govern them better? 
What do resource-based, dynamic capabilities and behavioral approaches say about the boundaries and 
internal organization of public entities? Does framing public-policy problems in this way generate new 
insights, or does it simply re-label existing understandings?  
4.1. The nature and boundaries of public organizations 
The discussion in section 2.2 above on market co-creation suggests that private and public organi-
zations, seeking to leverage the resources and capabilities they own and manage, evolve and interact in 
complex ways. The capabilities of legal and regulatory systems, for example, emerge and extend along 
with those of the industries they govern and regulate. A salient example is the allocation of the electro-
magnetic spectrum (Coase, 1959; De Vany et al., 1969; Faulhaber & Farber, 2003). In most countries 
radio frequencies are owned, de jure, by the nation as a whole, and leased to private operators under 
public, regulatory supervision. Coase (1959) analyzed the nature, behavior, and efficiency consequences 
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of the US Federal Communications Commission as the commercial radio industry was born. More 
recently, as the demand for spectrum allocation has grown dramatically, telecommunications regulators 
learned to use complex auction mechanisms in an attempt to allocate frequencies to their highest-valued 
users, with mixed results (Crampton & Schwartz, 2000; Klemperer, 2002). Clearly, the capabilities (and 
limitations) of the regulatory apparatus emerged and expanded as the industry itself took shape, and has 
continued to evolve as the technology matured. Today, formal legal institutions are struggling to keep up 
with market and technological developments in the area of intellectual property (e.g., digital media).
5
  
How can such processes of co-creation be managed or directed to minimize the harm from rent-
seeking, judicial and administrative error, regulatory capture, and regime uncertainty? We are unaware of 
any research examining this problem from a resource-based or dynamic capabilities perspective, and it 
seems like a promising opportunity for joint work by legal scholars, regulatory economists, and 
management scholars. More generally, researchers should look at the relationships among various levels 
of institutional and organizational activity, along the lines of the four levels suggested by Williamson 
(2000): embeddedness (informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and religion), the institutional 
environment (formal rules of the game such as property law), governance (the play of the game, as 
manifest in contracts and organizations), and resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities, 
and incentive alignment). Decisions about resource allocation, focusing on equating benefits and costs at 
the margin, are made moment-by-moment, while changes in governance, aiming to align governance 
structures with transactional characteristics, occur more slowly. Changes to, and the evolution of, the 
institutional environment and embedded norms take place even more gradually, and are (particularly in 
the case of embedded norms) typically the ―spontaneous‖ result of unintended consequences. Research on 
public organizational capabilities must obviously take the time dimension into account. 
Private firms evolve and adapt in response to changes in the institutional environment, in efforts 
to create and capture value. Evidence on firm boundaries, for example, suggests that firms internalize 
                                                          
5 Even in the case of the spectrum, critics charge that an open-access, commons-based model (e.g., fee simple 
rules with easement provisions) could make better use of modern frequency needs and capabilities than the 
current exclusive-license property-rights model (Faulhaber & Farber, 2003). 
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transactions as a response to weaknesses in the institutional environment. In countries with stable legal 
institutions, relatively efficient courts, and reasonable default rules for contract terms, for example, 
contracts tend to be less complete. If contracting parties can trust the courts to fill in the gaps, why bother 
to write out every contingency? Likewise, if a country has an efficient external capital market, firms can 
be small and specialized, relying on the capital markets to allocate resources among business units, but if 
the external capital market performs poorly, diversified business groups may arise to utilize their internal 
capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). However, Aggarwal, et al. (2009) find that firms tend to 
establish better mechanisms for corporate governance in countries that already have strong rules for 
investor protection, suggesting a complementary, rather than substitute, relationship between aspects of 
the institutional environment and firms‘ preferred institutional arrangements.  
4.2. Growth and governance 
As noted above, behavioral views of organizations emphasize adaptive expectations, bounded 
rationality, organizational learning, routines, problemistic and slack-induced search, satisficing, sequential 
decision making, uncertainty avoidance, and the quasi-resolution of intra-firm conflict through the use of 
slack. Higgs‘s (1987) analysis of the growth of government in the United States in the twentieth century 
illustrates many aspects of this framework. Higgs (1987) shows that many New Deal regulatory agencies 
were thinly disguised, quickly resurrected versions of similar, ostensibly temporary, agencies set up 
during World War I, enacting virtually identical policies. The labor-market provisions of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), for example, copied almost exactly the language of War Labor Board 
provisions from 1918, while other NIRA policies were copied from the War Industries Board. The New 
Deal‘s Reconstruction Finance Corporation was modeled on World War I‘s War Finance Corporation, 
while the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 copied the Lever Act of 1917. Moreover, the expanded 
role taken on by the state during these periods remained largely in place once the crisis passed, leading to 
what Higgs (1987) terms a ―ratchet effect.‖ In the language of management theory, Higgs‘s (1987) 
general line of reasoning is that government officials (regulators, courts, and elected officials), as well as 
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private agents such as business executives, farmers and labor unions develop capabilities in economic and 
social planning during particular crisis periods and that, due to indivisibilities and transaction costs, tend 
to possess excess capacity in periods between crises. To leverage this excess capacity, they look for ways 
to keep these ―temporary‖ measures in place.6  
As capabilities emerge and develop they may also be shared between private and public 
organizations, partly through the ―revolving door‖ linking top-level management positions across 
government and corporate entities. Defense contractors, global construction firms, and private military 
companies whose senior leadership positions are occupied by former military and government officials 
are an obvious example. A 1971 congressional report on U.S. conglomerates described Litton Industries, 
then a major military contractor, as follows: ―Sophisticated in the inter-relationships between the 
government and private sectors of commercial activities, Litton has sought to apply technological 
advances, novel management techniques, and system concepts developed in government business to an 
expanding segment of the commercial economy‖ (U.S. Judiciary Committee, 1971: 360) These ―system 
concepts,‖ of course, were the financial accounting and statistical control techniques pioneered by Litton 
CEO Tex Thornton in World War II, when he headed the ―Whiz Kids‖ at the Army‘s Statistical Control 
group. Robert McNamara, his leading protégé, would then apply the same techniques to the management 
of Ford Motor Company, and later to the management of the Vietnam War.
7
 
                                                          
6 Downs‘s (1966, 1967) influential analysis of bureaucracy emphasizes personnel dynamics, rather than the 
development of capabilities, as the driver of growth. Government agencies expand and contract, Downs 
(1966, 1967) maintains, in response to changes in public demands for their services. Because bureaucracies 
tend to concentrate decision authority at the top of the hierarchy, the personalities of top officials are 
particularly important, and periods of rapid growth tend to attract a disproportionate share of ―climbers,‖ 
those who particularly value power, income, and prestige. Led by climbers, ‗[t]he bureau becomes 
continuously more willing and able to innovate and to expand its assigned social functions by inventing new 
ones or ‗capturing‘ those now performed by other less dynamic organizations. Such further expansion tends 
to open up even more opportunities for promotion. This in turn attracts more climbers, who make the 
bureau still more willing and able to innovate and expand, and so on. Rapid growth of a bureau‘s social 
functions thus leads to a cumulative change in the character of its personnel, which tends to accelerate its rate 
of growth still further‖ (Downs, 1966: 19–20). 
7 On Litton see also Sobel (1984): 68–72. On the relationship between Thornton and McNamara see Shapley 
(1993) and Byrne (1993). 
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How are these kinds of co-evolutionary processes best managed and governed? Can they be 
channeled into uses that create social value? Here the role of governance is particularly important. 
Penrose (1959) emphasized that competitive advantage is generated not by resources per se, but the 
services of those resources. The value of these services depends on the knowledge and effort of the firm‘s 
management team (Foss, et al. 2008; Kor, 2003). As Alchian and Demsetz put it: ―efficient production 
with heterogeneous resources is a result not of having better resources, but in knowing more accurately 
the relative productive performances of those resources‖ (1972: 793). Performance can thus be improved 
not only by substituting resources, but by replacing the top-management team.  
Governments and government agencies are often slow to change leadership, however. Elections 
take place at infrequent intervals; agency heads are sometimes removed for poor performance, but may be 
retained or replaced for political reasons. The creation of the US Department of Homeland Security as a 
recombination of the resources of seven previously existing, stand-alone agencies, mentioned above, 
provides an interesting case. Did this reorganization represent an efficient consolidation, exploiting scale 
and scope economies by using fixed factors more efficiently and reducing transaction costs among 
operating units, or was it a political response to a crisis that avoided replacing members of the appropriate 
top-management teams? 
4.3. Rules versus discretion 
Just as private organizations are characterized by both rules and actions — what Pentland and 
Feldman (2008) call ―ostensive‖ and ―performative‖ aspects, respectively, of routines — public 
organizations have both their official, stated rationales and purposes, and their de facto policies and 
procedures. To what extent should these policies and procedures be constrained to follow fixed, typically 
formal, guidelines, as opposed to granting latitude and autonomy to public agents? This question recalls 
the ―rules versus discretion‖ debate in monetary economics: following fixed rules provides credibility but 
limits agents‘ ability to deviate from established procedures in extraordinary circumstances. In the last 
eighteen months, central-bank and treasury departments in the United States and European Union have 
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assumed greatly expanded authority in response to the financial crisis (for example, the US Federal 
Reserve System‘s purchase of mortgaged-backed securities and other ―toxic assets‖ from private financial 
institutions). Giving public agents the latitude to engage in performative routines that deviate from their 
ostensible mandates (or previously established, and hence expected, routines) raises challenging issues.
8
 
4.4. Privatization and quasi-privatization 
Consider, as another example, the placement of publicly owned resources such as prisons and 
military capability into the hands of private agents for stewardship and deployment (Avant, 2005; Baum 
& McGahan, 2010; Cabral, Lazzarini & Azevedo, 2009). Private actors may be able to lower the costs of 
deployment, but the resources may not be preserved or developed in the public interest. Therefore, there 
may be a conflict between preserving the resource‘s value in the public interest and deploying the 
resource in the public interest.  
Theories of regulatory capture, regulatory agency, public efficiency, and project finance have 
dealt extensively with the hazards and opportunities in private administration. Yet the transfer of 
resources for private administration in the public interest is only one example of the ways in which 
private and public actors interact over critical resources. Opportunities for innovation through public–
private partnerships, privatization, and public administration are sorely needed for addressing the public-
policy that arise, for example, through the (temporary) public ownership of General Motors. What can the 
government accomplish in the stewardship of GM‘s resources that could not be accomplished when the 
firm was privately owned and managed? The deepest opportunities may reside in re-configurations of 
resources in pursuit of the construction of a national high-speed train system, or in the advanced of new 
standards for the promotion of highly-fuel efficient vehicles.  
                                                          
8 Hayek (1960), in particular, maintained that public policy should be guided, wherever possible, by abstract, 
general rules, rather than discretionary procedures. On the tension between Hayek‘s (1960) emphasis on the 
rule of law and spontaneous order, see Daumann (2007). 
 
 
27 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
The current paper posits that resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches to 
applicable to the issue of the boundaries and governance of public organization and the public–private 
nexus. Indeed, some behavioral ideas may be even more relevant to public organization (March & Olsen, 
1996; Scott, 1995). The leveraging of comparative advantages by public and private actors in market and 
value co-creation can provide a framework on the nature and boundaries of comparative economic organi-
zation, while behavioral ideas can add value toward understanding how to govern these activities. 
We emphasize that the next generation of research in the evolving science of organization must 
go beyond unsophisticated views of state actors on the one hand, and overly optimistic views of property 
rights evolving toward efficiency via private contracting on the other hand.  One of the first steps required 
is to join private contracting models of property rights evolution with the interest-group theory of 
legislations and government --- what Eggertsson (1990) calls the interest group theory of property rights. 
Finally, in terms of theory development, this paper extends resource-based theories of private 
competitive advantage to the public sector in terms of (a) identification of resources, (b) assessing the 
existence of strategic resources, (c) evaluating the sustainability of organizational advantage, and           
(d) assessing the appropriability of value by an organization. These extensions are summarized in Table 1. 
Furthermore, we claimed in this paper that the concept of market and value co-creation and the leveraging 
of resources and (differential) capabilities to effect this can, on the one hand, provide a novel explanation 
of the nature of the state and its growth, as well as the public-private nexus. On the other hand, behavioral 
ideas, such as bounded rationality, the absence of a clear objective function, and the use of slack in 
conflict resolution (as well as ways in which organizational and incentive structures emerge and can 
frame decisions and filter information) can help explain the failure of many public organizations to 
achieve more effectively sustainable value and market co-creation. The devising of governance structures 
to obtain this objective is, in our view, fundamental for efficient public governance, and the area in which 
most progress can be realized through the leveraging of organization science and strategy scholarship.  
We can and will do better.    
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Table 1: The extension of resource-based theories of private competitive advantage to the public sector 
 Private Public 
Identification of resources Owned or controlled by identifiable individuals or groups 
operating voluntarily in a market setting 
Owned by states or any communal authority that has the ability to 
use legally sanctioned coercion to acquire and deploy 
Criteria for assessing the 
existence of strategically 
important resources (Barney 1991) 
Useful for assessing the source of competitive advantage 
defined in terms of superior performance over rivals 
Useful for identifying how and why decision rights are allocated 
across public agencies; amenable to the analysis of the emergency, 
boundaries and growth of public agencies 
 Valuable Resources must be deployable into a commercially 
valuable process where they may yield returns 
Resources must be deployable into a publicly valuable process that 
is adjudicated through budget allocation, re-election, or re-
appointment 
 Rare Resources must be scarce, and in particular must be 
difficult to acquire among rivals who compete to attract 
the returns to the resource 
Resources must be scarce, and in particular must be difficult to 
acquire by rival agencies that seek to perform the services of the 
focal agency 
 Inimitable Resources must be hard to imitate either through 
construction or acquisition 
Resources must be difficult for rival agencies to create or acquire 
either through market processes or by coercion 
 Non-Substitutable Resources must not be subject to being "built around" or 
substituted  
Resources must not be subject to being "built around" or 
substituted 
Criteria for assessing sustain-
ability of organizational advantage 
Useful for determining whether competitive advantage 
will persist over time 
Useful for determining whether an organization will persist over 
time  
 Difficult to transfer Akin to rarity -- Resources must be tied uniquely to the 
organization to confer sustained advantage upon it 
Resources must be identified or tied uniquely to the focal agency 
to confer sustainability  
 Inimitability same as above same as above 
 Non-Substitutability same as above same as above 
 Durability Resources must endure to create long-term advantage Resources must endure to be the basis of longevity 
Criteria for assessing the 
appropriability of value by an 
organization 
 Complementarity 
Multiple assets enable the achievement of organizational 
goals 
Resources are combined within agencies in pursuit of 
organizational mandate, mission or goals 
 Property rights The ability of a controlling organization to exclude others 
from profiting from the deployment of the resource 
The ability of a controlling agency to conserve the resource in 
support of the achievement of mandate, mission or goals 
 Governance The organization's ability to deploy resources more 
effectively and efficiently than potential rivals 
The organization's ability to deploy resources more effectively and 
efficiently than challengers to the agency's position 
 Embeddedness The ways in which an organization builds clusters of 
activities and complementary resources around the focal 
resource 
The ways in which an organization builds clusters of activities and 
complementary resources around the focal resource 
 
